encouraging equity portfolio and foreign direct investment and discouraging short-term capital inflows and of promoting better risk management so as to prevent large corporate exposures to a depreciation of the currency. Beneath the debates on borrowing level and structure lies an implicit assumption of a capital market failure. Somehow, capital account liberalization per se does not induce financial markets to generate the right economic signals. There is no arguing that short-term, dollardenominated debt constitutes a poor hedge against liquidity and currency risks. (For an empirical analysis and a questioning of the causal link, see Enrica Detragiache and Antonio Spilimbergo, 2001.) But, presumably, borrowers design their financial structures to their own benefit, and one cannot presuppose that dangerous forms of debt constitute suboptimal liability structures.
This paper identifies and focuses on a specific market failure, stemming from a dual-and common-agency problem. In contract economics, dual agency, also called "moral hazard in teams," refers to a situation in which the welfare of a principal is affected by the combined actions of two agents. Common agency in contrast arises when a single agent's action affects the welfare of multiple principals. The paper's take is that, in a private lending arrangement, the investor's prospect of recouping his investment depends on the behavior of the borrower, with whom he contracts, and of the borrower's government, with whom he does not. That is, investor returns depend on government policy as well as the firm's managerial choices. This dual-agency problem translates into a common-agency one in which pairwise optimal contracts exert externalities on each other through their impact on country incentives: The government is a common agent of all firms (borrower-investor pairs), and its policy choice depends on a representative financial contract, but not, with a large number of private sector players, on the financial contract of any single firm.6
The model has three dates. Date 0 is the financing stage, in which borrowing levels and structures are specified by pairwise optimal con-tracts between foreign and domestic lenders and private sector companies. Domestic capital is limited, and thus the benefit from capital account liberalization is the firms' access to foreign capital (I will occasionally invoke risk diversification as well). Profits accrue and are distributed according to contractual commitments at date 2.
The date-2 outcomes depend on a policy selected by the government at date 1. Following the international economics literature,7 the government favors domestic interests over foreign ones. And, when arbitrating among domestic interests, it may either put equal weights on domestic constituencies' surpluses or engage in redistributive politics.
The government impacts the foreign investors' return through the exercise of its many control rights. A first set of control rights held by the government affects both domestic and foreign investors' returns as in the case of a change in corporate governance and bankruptcy laws or in the resources affected to their enforcement, or a change in tax and labor laws.8 A second set of control rights affects the tradablenontradable mix and international collateral. Foreigners are ultimately reimbursed in tradables. Any government policy that reduces the amount of tradable goods that can be returned to foreigners can exert a negative externality on foreign investors. Examples of government moral hazard with respect to the mix includes encouraging excessive investments in the nontradable sector, most commonly in real estate, failing to sink export promoting investments, for example investments in public infrastructure for tourism, depleting international reserves, failing to diversify exports, thus making repayment to foreigners riskier, and, when foreigners hold domestic currency denominated assets, failing to take steps that would reduce the risk of depreciation of the currency. All these behaviors reduce the return to foreign investors.9
The model embodies two possible sources of time inconsistency. First, as in the sovereign debt literature, domestic interests prevail over foreign ones which, if anticipated, result in scant or more expensive foreign borrowing.10 Second, when domestic firms are subject to agency costs, the date-l policy choice no longer internalizes the possibility that an investorfriendly course of action alleviates credit rationing and attracts capital.
Attempts to alleviate the cost of time inconsistency belong to two distinct categories. The first refers to the abandonment of sovereign rights and has received much attention in the literatures on trade (e.g., joining the World Trade Organization [WTO]) and central banking (e.g., making the central bank independent). The second addresses common agency and the resulting lack of coordination in foreign bor-9 To these must be added, of course, less subtle ways of reducing foreigners' returns, as when the Argentinian government pleases local firms through "peso-ification" of dollar debts.
Commentaries often downplay the role of moral hazard in recent crises, on the grounds that following a crisis incumbent politicians may lose office and that IMF programs further erode their power. There are two issues with this argument. First, excluding government moral hazard on the ground that no finance minister would voluntarily provoke a crisis is like saying that fire insurance does not create moral hazard because homeowners do not usually set fire to their house once insured. The problem with governments and homeowners is not that they will set fire to their homes but rather that they will be less cautious at the margin. Governments will not take the actions that reduce the probability of a crisis ten years from now from 5 percent to, say, 1 percent, if they entail an immediate political cost.
Second, "government moral hazard" is usually given a narrow definition and related to the investors' expectation of a banking bailout. Actions that directly impact the value of foreign investors' assets are less likely to generate a backlash.
10 To be certain, the U.S. government also impacts the return of investors in GM, Intel or a Silicon Valley startup. However, dual agency is much more relevant in a financially integrated economy than in a financially isolated economy, for two reasons: First, the government has much less incentive to defend the investors' interests when these investors do not vote or more generally have limited political leverage. Second, the government has many more degrees of freedom in the open economy context as it can impact the tradable-nontradable mix.
rowing by altering private sector incentives. I focus on this latter and newer aspect."
The paper first looks at aggregate borrowing. Section I studies whether and when partial capital account liberalization benefits countries in the presence or absence of credit rationing. While no strong case can be built on a priori grounds that countries over-or underborrow, the section identifies some factors that call for or against capital controls.
The paper then shifts attention to structure issues and analyzes whether and when equity portfolio investments and home biases (Section II), longer maturities (Section III) and domestic currency denomination (Section IV) enhance borrowing countries' access to international lending. Section V summarizes and concludes.
A general theme of the analysis of borrowing structure is that dangerous forms of finance are also "policy resistant;" they make the government more accountable, ultimately to the benefit of the country. Encouraging foreign direct and equity portfolio investment and promoting international diversification do not encourage accountability. Some match between stakeholders and political constituencies must be achieved. Debt financing and small frictions inducing a home bias, therefore, should not be the object of widespread opprobrium, even though, as Section II shows, they will be encouraged by politicians eager to favor their corporate friends and then may have perverse consequences.
Closely related insights apply to what Barry Eichengreen and Ricardo Hausmann (1999) call the original sin, referring to emerging markets' widespread practice of borrowing short and in foreign currency. Section II develops a generalequilibrium model of independent interest, in which domestic firms optimally design the term structure of their liabilities in anticipation of future government policies and the government responds to these privately optimal, but uncoordinated financial structures when selecting a domestic-welfare maximizing policy. It shows that forcing private borrowers to tilt the maturity structure toward the long term reduces welfare. Section IV studies the choice of currency denomination and again shows that risk exposure is the flip side of policy resistance.
By focusing on a specific market failure (lack of coordination of private sector borrowing), the paper delivers strong results and sharp (though potentially controversial) policy prescriptions. While I view the particular market failure as important and the public policy effects as first order, I also acknowledge that a broader view embodying other well-grounded market failures is warranted. In this respect, the paper's analysis can be read from a different perspective, namely that of a complementarity between "corporate finance reform" and "government governance reform."12 Public policies that counter dangerous forms of finance, such as taxes on shortterm capital inflows or foreign currency borrowing13 or the subsidization of foreign direct investment, have more appeal when the country's constitutional design, institutional features (such as the creation of pension funds), domestic politics, and residents' pattern of investment (home versus abroad) concur to put investor protection reasonably high on the rulers' priority list. Conversely, banning dangerous forms of finance is likely to be more costly when the government's commitment toward investors is weak. With this perspective, the reader can take along the highlighted effects without necessarily embracing all policy implications. Bulow and Rogoff (1989b) show how creditor country governments may be gamed into contributing to rescheduling agreements. Kraay et al. (2000) argue that countries minimize their exposure to sovereign risk by keeping small net asset positions, and even small gross asset positions if transfers of ownership involve large transaction costs. Jeffrey Sachs (e.g., 1989) and others have argued that countries with high levels of sovereign debt are subject to debt overhang and invest too little because part of the benefits from this investment accrue to foreigners (which implies that the sovereign and foreign lenders can reach a Pareto improvement by renegotiation); Application 1 in Section II, subsection B, makes a similar point in the context of private sector borrowing and general public policies (although renegotiation is less credible in our context since individual borrower-lender pairs have no private incentive to renegotiate). In contrast with the sovereign debt literature, this paper emphasizes uncoordinated borrowing and its policy implications; it also takes a much broader view of "repudiation" as it applies to the exercise of all control rights held by governments; last, it focuses on rather different issues, such as original sin.
Related
The international trade literature on time inconsistency and excessive protection (Staiger and Guido Tabellini, 1987; Kiminori Matsuyama, 1990 ; Aaron Tomell, 1991) is also relevant here; it for example shows that the socially optimal policy-free trade, say-is often time inconsistent and that the time-consistent policy frequently leads to (ex ante) excessive protection. Giovanni Maggi and Andres RodriguezClare (1998) add capture-by-interest groups as in Gene Grossman and Elhanan Helpman (1994); politicians may want to commit to free trade (join the WTO) in order to avoid an ex ante misallocation of investment in favor of the sector that will receive protection ex post, even though this implies forgoing future contributions by interest groups.
My analysis also complements Tomell and Andres Velasco's (1992) and Velasco's (1996) modeling of capital flights, in which domestic residents decide how much to invest at home and abroad in the presence of domestic redistributive policies or increasing fiscal returns.14 These contributions focus on capital flows from poor to rich countries; I focus on moral hazard by a borrowing rather than lending country. The implications accordingly differ. For example, the domestic residents' ability to invest abroad acts as a disciplining device in Tornell-Velasco, while a home bias tends to be beneficial in my analysis. Furthermore, a major concern of this paper is the impact of borrowing structure on government moral hazard, which requires modeling capital inflows and composition. Wolf Wagner (2001) shows how a home bias can reduce government moral hazard in a world in which investors want to diversify internationally, and governments tax their residents (for their own sake) in order to discourage them from competing to supply (investment) inputs that partly benefit foreign investors.
There are few corporate finance approaches to international finance. Mark Gertler and Rogoff (1990) is a notable exception. This paper however is primarily interested in the size of capital flows, and has no government moral hazard, and a fortiori no dual-and commonagency problem. Government moral hazard in contrast plays an important role in Olivier Jeanne's work (1999, 2000a, b, 2002) . Jeanne shows that a lack of domestic monetary credibility may induce private borrowers to borrow in foreign currency. While foreign currency debt is dangerous in the event of bad shock, it reflects optimal risk management by firms conditional on the lack of domestic monetary credibility. This may arise because of the interaction between government's moral hazard and commitment and signaling problems at the level of 14 An earlier contribution to capital flights and increasing fiscal returns is Eaton (1987) . In that paper, foreign lenders require a government guarantee on their loans (as the latter is the only entity able to enforce their contracts, say). Domestic residents have an incentive to invest their money abroad and thereby escape taxation if other residents also do, since then foreign lending and concomitant government guarantees increase. The process may result in multiple equilibria.
entrepreneurs (Jeanne, 1999 (Jeanne, , 2000a or bankruptcy costs (Jeanne, 2002) .
Last, a number of themes developed in this paper are to some extent part of the "folk wisdom" in the international economics community, rather than related to a specific literature. Relative to this, the paper's contribution is twofold. First, the corporate finance techniques and the dual-and common-agency formulation allow me to build a formal framework to validate the insights and identify their limits. Second, a formal model takes the folk wisdom in new directions, most notably by incorporating political economy considerations.
I. Inefficient Borrowing Level

A. Bare-Bones Framework
The bare-bones framework abstracts from the issues of domestic incidence and redistributive politics by focusing on entrepreneurs and foreign investors (so, it ignores domestic savings, and assumes that the incidence of government policy is entirely on firms and foreign investors).
A small country is populated by a large number (technically, a continuum of mass 1) of identical, risk neutral "entrepreneurs," who more generally stand for domestic firms or insiders. There is a single (tradable) good and three dates, t = 0, 1, 2. The right-hand side of (7) will be called the commitment effect. We then obtain the following simple result: While we would often expect less care to be exerted by the government as foreign investment and therefore foreign ownership in the 17 These can be seen as shrinking the goverment's choice set A country increase (da*/dlf < 0), it is equally easy to find circumstances under which, in the absence of credit rationing, a capital control lowers welfare. For example, if the policy is subject to increasing returns to scale,' as may be the case for some types of supporting infrastructure, a more massive capital inflow may actually result in a more investor-friendly outcome. Relatedly, suppose that here are increasing fiscal returns to scale as in Olivier Blanchard and Lawrence Summers (1987) and Velasco (1996) ; that is, the country must rely on capital taxes to fund an incompressible level of government expenditures. A capital control shrinks the tax base and raises per-unit capital taxes, with potentially detrimental effects (for example, a reduction in domestic savings, if these are introduced into the picture). 9 Before putting more structure on the model, let us look at the general impact of credit rationing.
C. Credit Rationing
Borrowing is usually subject to substantial agency costs. The study of the concomitant problem of credit rationing and of the various ways in which firms attempt to reduce its impact has spawned a large variety of models. Fortunately, these corporate finance models have many common implications. For the purpose of this paper the common feature of interest is that borrowing is constrained by the maximal expected income that can be promised to investors. The latter is called the "pledgeable income" and (for an anticipated policy a*) will be denoted Vf(If, a*). In corporate finance models, aVf/lIf < 1 for the equilibrium investment (for, if the pledgeable income increased faster than investment, investors would benefit from a higher investment level and so there would be no credit rationing!). Section II, subsection A, provides an illustration of the notion of pledgeable income.
In corporate finance, the unconstrained borrowing condition (5) Because credit rationing is pervasive in all economies, and especially in borrowing countries, the analysis suggests that beneficial attempts at addressing government moral hazard are more likely to act on the structure of borrowing than on its level.21 We therefore turn to a more structured version of this general model to investigate such policies. The time-consistent policy a* (which satisfies aV/aa = aVf/la > 0) thus is doubly biased relative to the commitment policy asB. First, and as in the absence of credit rationing, it does not internalize the foreigners' welfare. Second, and a specificity of credit rationing, an investor-20 In this bare-bones model, foreigners would have an incentive to lobby in favor of investor-friendly policies only at date 1. They would have an incentive to do so at date 0 if they already had some stake in the country at date 0.
II. Inefficient Borrowing
Note further that even if international investors have no stake at date 0, investor-friendly measures in (or a better commitment by) a number of borrowing countries would raise the demand for capital and the world interest rate and ultimately benefit these investors. 21 Policy intervention alternatively may relax the credit constraint, as in the case, considered in Section II, subsection B, of an improvement in corporate governance. rate of return equal to 0.22 The entrepreneur finances the shortfall from foreigners: I -A -
At date 2, a firm either succeeds and then yields RI, or fails, that is yields nothing. Only a fraction of income is pledgeable: Investors receive rl -RI in case of success, while the entrepreneur appropriates (R -r)I. Neither gets anything in case of failure.
The probability of success is p + r, where r is determined by the government after the investments are sunk. (So r is the action a of the previous section.) Enhancing the probability of success of domestic firms by r involves an increasing and strictly convex lump-sum cost /y(T) per unit of investment. This cost is borne by domestic residents.23 The assumption that the cost y is proportional to investment is purely for analytical convenience. For example, the theory would carry through if y included a fixed component. The cost 'y may be incurred by the firms' insiders-as in the case of a strengthening in corporate governance or more flexible labor laws-or by the population as a whole-as in the case of investments in infrastructure financed by taxation or a reduction in public expenditures. I will discuss incidence shortly.
For equilibrium value r*, the pledgeable income is V-(p + r*)rI, and the entrepreneur's date-2 expected payoff 22 For example, there is an alternative storage technology with which the domestic investors can obtain a zero rate of return.
Even with fixed domestic savings, it might be the case that the amount invested at home not be inelastic because the domestic investors invest abroad. Note, though, that, unlike Tornell-Velasco (1992) and Velasco (1996), we focus on borrowing countries. And so, provided that foreign investors are willing to lend to the country and (unlike in Eaton, 1987) domestic investors are not discriminated against relative to foreign investors, risk-neutral domestic investors have no strict incentive to invest abroad. Risk aversion and portfolio diversification, by contrast, provide incentives to invest abroad: see Application 2. 23 It is straightforward to allow for taxes on foreigners' portfolio income. See also the discussion of capital inflow taxation below.
(p + r*)(R -r)I.
Example: The wedge between the full value RI and the pledgeable part rI, which is a distinctive feature of corporate finance, can for example be derived from a classic moral hazard problem. Suppose that the entrepreneur can obtain private benefit BI, proportional to investment, by misbehaving (and no such benefit when behaving). The probability of success then falls from (p + Incidence.-The section proceeds in two steps. First, it assumes that the government chooses the date-1 policy so as to maximize domestic welfare. Then, it generalizes the analysis to redistributive politics by allowing the government to put different weights on entrepreneurs and domestic investors/consumers. While incidence does not affect the date-1 policy choice under domestic-welfare maximization, it impacts the date-0 investment; in particular, suppose that the date-1 cost of the policy is x-y(T)I for entrepreneurs, and (1 -x)y(T)I for domestic investors/consumers.24 Entrepreneurs, 24 The ex post incidence coincides with the ex ante (date-O) incidence under our assumption that y is lump-sum. If the cost were not lump-sum, then the ex ante incidence y would in general exceed the ex post incidence x; in particular, a tax on capital decided at date 1 but anticipated at date 0 would be passed through to entrepreneurs via an increase in the interest rate.
Note also that the fraction xy ( Firms issue (safe) debt corresponding to the salvage value RFI of its assets, and the rest represents equity claims. It is easily seen that it is optimal for the entrepreneurs to own equity and no debt since this arrangement maximizes their incentives and they have no demand for insurance. Thus the entire debt is held by domestic and foreign investors. is compatible with a continuum of possible foreign equity stakes. But, while investors individually are indifferent as to which claim they hold, they collectively are not. Indeed, the government selects its policy at date 1 so as to solve:
max{[(p + r)[(R -r) + a4r] -y(T)]I/(r*)}.
T Thus, an increase in the foreigners' equity holdings/value at stake, or equivalently in af, reduces discipline and country welfare. 31 Again, I wish to emphasize the broader implications of this analysis rather than its details. The investors' indifference between domestic debt and equity only offers analytical convenience and can be broken in several ways. For example, a favorable capital adequacy treatment encouraging foreign banks to hold debt or an implicit deposit insurance in domestic banks pushes toward a low of. Similarly, the resort to high-powered monitoring by domestic conglomerates encourages equity The broad point is that at the margin the basic externality applies: When a foreigner substitutes equity for debt, he does not internalize the change in the government's incentives and therefore the domestic entrepreneurs' increase in the cost of funds. In this sense, the conclusion is robust to a more sophisticated description of portfolio allocation.32
The following proposition summarizes our analysis: PROPOSITION 3: In comparison to the firstbest government policy (for which the marginal cost of the policy is equal to its marginal benefit), the equilibrium policy under a domesticwelfare maximizing government is more investor-friendly under commitment, and less investor-friendly in the time-consistent solution. Furthermore, provided that most of the cost of the policy is borne by the productive sector, country welfare increases when (a) domestic savings increase and/or exhibit a stronger home bias, (b) a capital control is relaxed, provided that foreign ownership is small, (c) marginal incentives are provided to foreigners to hold debt rather than equity.
C. Redistributive Politics
Suppose next that the government weighs domestic constituencies unequally. Namely, entrepreneurs receive weight k and non-entrepreneurs weight 1 -k. For example, one would expect k to be large under "crony capitalism"; in contrast, 1 -k should increase with the creation of 32 A caveat, though: Government moral hazard may also affect the value of debt, in contrast with our depiction. A reduced budget for the enforcement of property rights in bankruptcy processes reduces the value rD obtained by debtholders in case of failure. A more general analysis thus trades off the negative impacts of an increase in foreign equity holdings and debt holdings on the two forms of moral hazard. The market allocation however has no reason to be efficient in that respect. pension funds, which make the median voter more concerned about portfolio returns. For simplicity I make no distinction between domestic savers and the median voter, although such a distinction would be warranted in many applications (indeed, the point on pension funds I just made implicitly rests on such a distinction. Pension funds imply that the median voter has a higher portfolio stake).
I assume that the government is stable in that the weights do not change between dates 0 and 1. This calls for two comments. First, even more so than previously, outside judgments on the government's policy are hard to formulate. As we will see, the latter may have very unpalatable features, which raises the usual moral dilemma of whether the international community ought to adopt a paternalistic attitude vis-a-vis a democratically elected government.33 Second, it would be interesting to study how the strategic choice of date-0 public policies affecting borrowing structure and level is affected by the possibility of government turnover.34
Under redistributive politics (k : 1/2), the incidence of the effort, y(r)I, incurred to boost profitability impacts the date-1 choice. As described earlier, I assume that a fraction x of this cost is borne by entrepreneurs and a fraction 1 -x by domestic savers. Let us focus on the two polar cases: As expected, if only a small fraction x is borne by the entrepreneurs (one can think of severe austerity measures or labor laws imposed on the population), the high emphasis on profitability may result in policies that are more investor-friendly than even the second-best policy under domestic-welfare maximization.3
Turning now to date 0, the government internalizes
[(p + T*)(R -r) -Xy(T*)]I(T*).
Because the date-1 policy is fixed, the government has no instrument to boost investment, which is its date-0 goal. It contents itself with laissez-faire,3 yielding, for salvage value RF per unit of investment, investment I(T*) given by: The monotone hazard rate condition is satisfied by almost all familiar distributions37 and will guarantee the concavity of the government's objective function.
I(T*) -A = [RF + (p + T*)r]I(T*).
Suppose next that k is close to
If the firm continues, it delivers as earlier at date 2 and with probability p + r, profit RI, of which rI is pledgeable to investors. is the average cost of bringing investment to completion [a unit of investment costs on average 1 + fg pftp)dp, yields s at date 1, and is maintained until date 2 with probability F(p)]. Simple computations yield the optimal threshold p = p*: MP* F(p) dp = 1-s and c(p*) = p*. Compared with a situation without liquidity shocks, the government adopts a more investorfriendly policy so as to reduce liquidation.
I assume that the country bears cost y(T)I per continuing finn and that this cost (or the fraction borne by entrepteneurs) is viewed as a lump-sum cost by the entrepreneurs (none of these assumptions is important
Equation (17), together with the monotone hazard rate property, yields the main insight of this section. Consider a small increase in the 41 Note that it is crucial for this section to employ a corporate finance rather than an Arrow-Debreu model. In the absence of agency cost, the firm would not face liquidity problems and so leverage would be irrelevant. 42 This assertion is true only locally. If T differs from r* so much that the right-hand side of this inequality exceeds pi or falls below po, the contract between financiers and the entrepreneur is renegotiated. But we are here interested in deriving the first-order condition.
short-term debt from the privately optimal value d*. This amounts to an equal reduction in the threshold p* for a given government policy. From (17), and using the monotone-hazard-rate property, the government partly offsets the shortage in liquidity through an increase in T:
In words, domestic firms do not internalize the disciplining effect of an increase in the level of their short-term debt level on the government's policy. Short-term debt fragilizes firms and forces the government to help them secure refinancing. This increased discipline in turn generates two welfare benefits that are ultimately reaped by domestic entrepreneurs. First, it improves the date-1 policy choice r*, and therefore financing conditions for a given level of investment. Second, it increases borrowing capacity, which is valuable given the presence of credit rationing.
B. Contingent Debt
Issuing noncontingent short-term debt is privately optimal in the deterministic equilibrium of Section III, subsection A. Thus the previous analysis is indeed an equilibrium analysis. More generally, though, optimal short-term debt ought to be state-contingent so as to react to macroeconomic news accruing at date 1 (in practice this flexibility is provided for example by indexed debt or by preferred equity).
This sensitivity to macroeconomic conditions in turn impacts the government's incentives. The Appendix checks that the insights obtained in Section III, subsection A, still hold when firms more generally issue state-contingent short-term debt. The only difference is that state-contingent debt generates more policy discipline.
More precisely, when T is random, the optimal refinancing decision is shown to be sensitive to prospects: tion about the firm's prospects. State-contingent debt makes the government policy more investor-friendly. In either case, a small increase in the shortterm debt from the privately optimal level raises country welfare.
IV. Liability Dollarization
A. Framework
To illustrate the impact of the choice of liability denomination in the simplest possible manner, let us ignore credit rationing.
The model is a real exchange rate one. There are two goods, a tradable good, valued by both domestic residents and foreigners, and a nontradable good, valued only by domestic residents.
As We will let e2 denote the date-2 price of tradables in terms on nontradables (note: a depreciation corresponds to an increase in e2). The date-2 consumption function is given by u2(c*(e2)) = e2
The domestic consumption of tradables decreases as the exchange rate depreciates.
The representative domestic resident is an entrepreneur who transforms a tradable input I* into a deterministic nontradable output y(I/) at date 2. The date-0 input I/f is borrowed from foreigners, as the entrepreneur is not endowed with tradables. The production function y(/I) is strictly concave and satisfies the Inada conditions. The entrepreneur commits to reimbursing d2 in tradable goods and d2 in nontradables. The amount d2 will be paid directly from y(If), and foreign investors will then need to convert it into tradables. In contrast, to reimburse d*, it will be incumbent on the entrepreneur to convert nontradable production at the going exchange rate.
While the theory below is purely one of the real exchange rate, I will, by a substantial leap of faith, interpret the denomination of debt in the tradable good as one in foreign currency (dollars). Note, though, that a similar story could be told in a monetary model, in which "depreciation" would be replaced by "nominal devaluation."44 Last, I formalize the common concern that recipients of large capital inflows may use them to finance large fiscal deficits or consumption booms by assuming that the government selects at date 1 a level of public good g* E [0, R*] (so the discretionary action a is here g*). The key assumption is that a higher level of public good The government overconsumes international reserves when part of the debt is labelled in nontradables. Forcing firms to engage in risk management reduces country welfare.
In this model, firms are individually indifferent as to the "currency" denomination of their liabilities. Of course, they would not be indifferent in richer models. For example, one could combine this analysis and that of Section III to look at optimal risk management when firms face liquidity shocks at the intermediate date. 45 The general point, though, is that at the margin the firms do not label enough their liabilities in tradables, as they do not internalize the disciplining effect of the denomination on government policy.
Remark: The assumption that the foreigners have no value at risk under foreign currency denomination is of course extreme. In practice, they have value at risk not only because governments may renege and directly expropriate a fraction of foreign holdings (a strategy not al- 45 The prospect of a government bailout may also affect this choice. In Martin Schneider and Tornell (2001), domestic firms (or banks) optimally denominate their foreign debt in tradable goods. That paper assumes that the government undertakes "systemic bailouts," i.e., bailouts are granted only if a critical mass of firms default. Tradable-good debt denomination is a gamble that increases the probability of receiving the bailout subsidy; in effect, it increases the probability that the firm goes bankrupt when other firms also do (i.e., when the price of nontradables over tradables is low), and so the government grants a bailout. A bailout policy on the other hand helps the credit-constrained domestic firms to borrow more.
More generally, "original sin features" that are induced by the prospect of domestic bank bailout or by Basle criteria on the lending-banks side are probably better addressed by a proper prudential regulation of domestic and foreign banks than by a broader prohibition of the features. The analysis provides theoretical ammunitions in support of Eichengreen and Hausmann's (1999) suggestion as to why original sin applies to all non-OECD countries while some developed countries are able to borrow in their own currencies. They propose that the latter countries "developed their domestic markets first, creating a political constituency that opposed opportunistic depreciation."
V. Concluding Remarks
An analysis of countries' lack of access to attractive levels and forms of financing must build on a description of why capital markets fail. This paper focuses on uncoordinated private sector borrowing. Borrowers and lenders have no individual incentive to internalize the impact of their private financing arrangement on country incentives; the resulting inefficiency is borne by the country itself. Three broad conclusions emerge:
(1) No strong case can be made on a priori grounds that countries over-or underborrow. Forces conducive to overinvestment include (a) a reduction in the quality of policy brought about by an increase in foreign ownership in the country, as well as two forces that are unrelated to international borrowing: (b) the incidence on domestic third parties of public policies supporting private sector borrowers, an incidence that (c) is exacerbated under crony capitalism. In contrast, (d) capital controls impose a substantial cost to the extent that firms are subject to credit rationing and therefore are deprived by controls of access to highly productive capital, and (e) median voter politics result in an insufficient internalization of the country's benefits from capital accounts liberalization.
(2) As to the form of liabilities, "dangerous forms of debt" cannot be presumed to be suboptimal for those who issue them. The analysis of the externalities involved in the choice of financial structure points at the flip side of risk exposure: dangerous forms of debt are also "policy resistant"; they make the government more accountable, ultimately to the benefit of the country. Encouraging foreign direct and equity portfolio investment and promoting international diversification do not encourage accountability. Some match between stakeholders and political constituencies must be achieved. Debt financing and small frictions inducing a home bias therefore should not be the object of widespread opprobrium, even though they will be encouraged by politicians eager to favor their corporate friends and then may have perverse consequences.
The critique concerning short maturities can be analyzed in a multistage framework in which firms optimally trade off the cost (liquidity shortage) and benefit (better access to capital) of short-term liabilities. Short-term liabilities unambiguously improve policy-making by a domestic-welfare maximizing government; this "public good" is not internalized by firms, whose maturity structure is therefore tilted toward long-term borrowing. While further effects must be accounted for (see below), this shows that strong views concerning shortterminism in capital flows may not be warranted.
The third member of the vulnerability trilogy, foreign currency denominated liabilities, is subject to a similar conclusion. Again, at the margin, borrowers do not internalize the disciplining impact of such borrowing.
(3) One cannot assess a country's ability to borrow and terms of borrowing without accounting for internal politics. The conclusions are reinforced or weakened depending on whether the interests of foreigners are aligned or dissonant with those of dominant domestic interest groups.
Overall, a country's level and quality of access to international capital depends not only on its level of international collateral,46 but also on a variety of institutional features such as the level of domestic savings, their location (home versus abroad), the extent of control rights held by political authorities, and the interests of dominant domestic political forces. These institutional features probably are part of the reason why the United States, in which the government has limited control rights and key political con- stituencies' interests are aligned with investors' interests (e.g., through the pension fund system), can borrow so much; and why many poor African countries, which have a much more pressing need for foreign capital but whose wealth is often appropriated by a small group and invested abroad, and whose leaders have substantial control over economic life, have almost no access to the international capital market. A systematic analysis transcending this anecdotal evidence and connecting institutional features and foreign borrowing would be very useful.
The paper focused on a common-agency externality through the impact of firms' financial structure on government behavior. One should not restrict analysis to this externality among borrowers. For example, firms may take socially insufficient precautions against distress if the social cost of unemployment is convex in the rate of unemployment or if a soft asset market leads to fire sales in downturns. Furthermore, I have not allowed for potential externalities, such as financial contagion externalities, among countries. Such externalities may lead to a qualification of some policy implications of the common-agency perspective;47 as discussed in the introduction, the broader point made in this paper will then be the complementarity between "corporate finance reform" and "government governance reform." Last, let me broaden the perspective. The paper took sovereign rights as given and looked at policies altering private sector behavior. A complementary approach, more in the tradition of the trade and central banking literatures, would focus on the devolution of sovereign rights.48 Clearly, many of the control rights 47 Another objection to foreign currency denominated debt is that, in a pegged exchange rate regime, it makes it hard for countries to resort to devaluation in order to address a balance-of-payments crisis. For example, Anne Krueger (2000) advocates delinking financial and balance-of-payments crises by making foreign currency obligations incurred by domestic entities unenforceable in court or by having developed countries force their financial institutions to accept liabilities abroad only in local currencies. 48 The devolution can take many forms, such as joining a multilateral organization, entering a monetary union or a free-trade agreement, and devolving authority for bankruptcy and corporate governance to independent courts. listed in the introduction cannot be transferred to foreign investors, who, in contrast with governments, are excessively preoccupied with profitability and would impose large welfare costs on the population. As suggested in Tirole (2002), corporate finance sheds some light on the tradeoffs in the allocation of control rights; but this allocation is a complex issue, that deserves a thorough treatment of its own.
APPENDIX: CONTINGENT DEBT
Noncontingent debt contracts were optimal in the context of Section III. More generally, though, contingent debt is an optimal reaction to a random environment. In particular, the threshold p* of Section III, subsection A, ought to be contingent on the realization of policy T; this in turn affects the choice of government policy. Let us check that the analysis of Section III, subsection A, is robust to contingent debt. To this purpose let us derive the optimal liquiditymanagement policy p*(T) when T is random. Letting ET denote expectations with respect to r, the generalizations of equations (14) Consequently, the sensitivity of the refinancing decision to prospects is higher than with noncontingent debt: dp*/dr = r > r. For e small, the only difference with (17) is that "r" is replaced by "r." State-contingent debt creates more discipline. Last, one can perform the same exercise as in Section III, subsection A: a small uniform increase in the debt level (i.e., a decrease in a) increases r for each e.
